Abstract. We introduce a new class of games, called social contribution games (SCGs), where each player's individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on society because of his presence. Our results reveal that SCGs constitute useful abstractions of altruistic games when it comes to the analysis of the robust price of anarchy. We first show that SCGs are altruism-independently smooth, i.e., the robust price of anarchy of these games remains the same under arbitrary altruistic extensions. We then devise a general reduction technique that enables us to reduce the problem of establishing smoothness for an altruistic extension of a base game to a corresponding SCG. Our reduction applies whenever the base game relates to a canonical SCG by satisfying a simple social contribution boundedness property. As it turns out, several well-known games satisfy this property and are thus amenable to our reduction technique. Examples include min-sum scheduling games, congestion games, second price auctions and valid utility games. Using our technique, we derive mostly tight bounds on the robust price of anarchy of their altruistic extensions. For the majority of the mentioned game classes, the results extend to the more differentiated friendship setting. As we show, our reduction technique covers this model if the base game satisfies three additional natural properties.
Introduction
Motivation and Background. The study of the inefficiency of equilibria in strategic games has been one of main research streams in algorithmic game theory in the last decade and contributed to the explanation of several phenomena observed in real life. More recently, researchers have also started to incorporate more complex social relationships among the players in such studies, accounting for the fact that players cannot always be regarded as isolated entities that merely act on their own behalf (see also [12] ). In particular, the extent by which other-regarding preferences such as altruism and spite impact the inefficiency of equilibria has been studied intensively; see, e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19] .
In this context, some counterintuitive results have been shown that are still not wellunderstood. For example, in a series of papers [4, 5, 7] it was observed that for congestion games the inefficiency of equilibria gets worse as players become more altruistically, therefore suggesting that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society. On the other hand, valid utility games turn out to be unaffected by altruism as their inefficiency remains unaltered under altruistic behavior [7] . These discrepancies triggered our interest in the research conducted in this paper. The basic question that we are asking here is: What is it that impacts the inefficiency of equilibria of games with altruistic players?
To this aim, we consider two different models that have previously been studied in the literature: the altruism model [7] and the friendship model [19] . In both models, one starts from a strategic game (called the base game) specifying the direct cost of each player and then extends this game by defining the perceived cost of each player as a function of his neighbors' direct costs. In the altruism model, player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of his direct cost and the overall social cost. In the more general friendship model, player i's perceived cost is a linear combination of his direct cost and his friends' costs.
In order to quantify the inefficiency of equilibria in our games we resort to the concept of the price of anarchy (PoA) [20] , which is defined as the worst-case relative gap between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum (over all instances of the game). By now, a standard approach to prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy is through the use of the smoothness framework introduced by Roughgarden [21] . Basically, this framework allows us to derive bounds on the robust price of anarchy by showing that the underlying game satisfies a certain (λ, µ)-smoothness property for some parameters λ and µ. The robust price of anarchy holds for various solution concepts, ranging from pure Nash equilibria to coarse correlated equilibria (see, e.g., Young [27] ).
The original smoothness framework [21] has been extended to both the altruism and the friendship model in [7] and [19] , respectively. Applying these adapted smoothness frameworks to bound the robust price of anarchy is often technically involved because of the altruistic terms that need to be taken into account additionally (see also the analyses in [7, 19] ).
Instead, we take a different approach here. As we will show, there is a natural class of games, which we term social contribution games (SCGs) , that is intimately connected with our altruism and friendship games. We establish a general reduction technique that enables us to reduce the problem of establishing smoothness for our altruism or friendship game to the problem of proving smoothness for a corresponding SCG. The latter is usually much simpler than proving smoothness for the altruism or friendship game directly. This also opens up the possibility to derive better bounds on the robust price of anarchy of these games through the usage of our new reduction technique.
Our Contributions. The main contributions presented in this paper are as follows:
-We introduce a new class of games, which we term social contribution games (SCGs), where each player's individual cost is defined as the cost he incurs on society because of his presence. Said differently, player i's cost is equal to the difference in social cost if player i is present/absent in the game. We show that SCGs are altruism-independently smooth, i.e., if the SCG is (λ, µ)-smooth then every altruistic extension is (λ, µ)-smooth as well. -We derive a general reduction technique to bound the robust price of anarchy of both altruism and friendship games. Basically, the reduction can be applied whenever the underlying base game is social contribution bounded, meaning that the [21] direct cost of each player is bounded by his respective cost in the corresponding SCG (for the friendship model a slightly stronger condition needs to hold). It is worth mentioning that this reduction preserves the (λ, µ)-smoothness parameters, i.e., the altruism or friendship game inherits the (λ, µ)-smoothness parameters of the SCG. -We generalize smoothness for friendship extensions to weight-bounded social cost functions. In previous papers, the used techniques usually required sum-boundedness, which is a stronger condition [19] . Applying this definition to scheduling games with weighted sum as social cost, we derive a nice characterization of those scheduling games whose robust PoA does not grow for friendship extensions. -We show that social contribution boundedness is satisfied by several well-known games, like min-sum scheduling games, congestion games, second-price auctions and valid utility games. Using our reduction technique, we then derive upper bounds on the robust price of anarchy of their friendship/altruism extensions. In most cases we prove matching lower bounds. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
Related Work.
Several articles propose models of altruism and spite [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16] . Among these articles, the inefficiency of equilibria in the presence of altruism and spite was studied for various games in [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11] . After its introduction in [21] , the smoothness framework has been extended to incomplete information settings [22, 24, 25] and altruism/spite settings [7, 19] .
The robust price of anarchy for minsum scheduling (not taking altruism or friendship into account) was studied in various papers such as [17] . They show that it does not exceed 2 for Q|| j C j (which we improve to a tight value of 3/2 in the special case P || j C j ). A value of 4 for R|| j w j C j has been proven in [9] .
Our work on linear congestion games generalizes a result in [1] . They show that the pure price of anarchy does not exceed 17/3 in a restricted friendship setting (α ij ∈ {0, 1}).
As indicated above, most related to our work are the articles [7, 19] . We significantly improve the bounds on the robust price of anarchy for congestion games and unrelated machine scheduling games in [19] and at the same time simplify the analysis by using our reduction technique.
Preliminaries
Let G = (N, {Σ i } i∈N , {C i } i∈N ) be a cost-minimization game, where N is the set of players, Σ i is player i's strategy space, Σ = i∈N Σ i is the set of strategy profiles, and C i : Σ → R denotes the cost player i must pay for a given strategy profile. We assume that each player seeks to minimize his cost. A social cost function C : Σ → R assigns a social cost to each strategy profile. We usually require C to be sum-bounded, i.e., C(s) ≤ i∈N C i (s) for all s ∈ Σ.
We denote payoff-maximization games as G = (N, {Σ i } i∈N , {Π i } i∈N ) with social welfare Π : Σ → R. In this case, each player i tries to maximize his utility (or payoff) Π i . Again, we usually assume that Π is sum-bounded, i.e. Π(s) ≥ i∈N Π i (s) for all s ∈ Σ.
In the following, we state most of the definitions and theorems only for costminimization games. The payoff-maximization case works similarly by reversing all inequalities.
Definition 1.
A coarse equilibrium of a cost-minimization game G is a probability distribution σ over Σ such that the following holds: If s is a random variable with distribution σ, then for all players i and all strategies s *
A mixed Nash equilibrium is a coarse equilibrium σ that is the product of independent probability distributions σ i on Σ i (for i ∈ N ). A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s ∈ Σ such that for all s
The coarse (resp. correlated, mixed, pure) price of anarchy (PoA) of a cost-minimization game G is defined as sup s C(s)/C(s * ), where s * minimizes C and s runs over the coarse (resp. correlated, mixed, pure) Nash equilibria of G. 3 The coarse (resp. correlated, mixed, pure) PoA of a class G of games is defined as the supremum of the respective PoA values of games in G.
Note that pure Nash equilibria constitute a subset of mixed Nash equilibria which constitute a subset of coarse equilibria. This implies that that the respective prices of anarchy are non-decreasing (in this order).
The Altruism Model
, where for any i ∈ N , the perceived cost is the convex combination
Σ as a real vector space). G is called the base game. The social cost function of G α is again C, i.e., the cost of the base game. The higher the 'altruism level' α i is, the more i cares about the society in general: player i behaves egoistically if α i = 0, whereas he is completely altruistic if α i = 1.
Definition 3.
Let G be a cost-minimization game with sumbounded social cost and consider an altruistic extension G α of G. G α is (λ, µ)-smooth if there exists an optimal strategy s * such that for any strategy s ∈ Σ,
where we abbreviate
Theorem 1 ([7]
). Let G α be an α-altruistic extension of G. Then the coarse (and thus the correlated, mixed and pure) PoA of G α is bounded from above by the robust PoA of G α .
The Friendship Model Definition 4 ([19]). Let
, where for any i ∈ N , the perceived cost is defined as
Like in the altruism model, we consider C, the social cost function of the base game, as the social cost for G α .
For players i and j, α ij can be interpreted as the level of affection i feels towards j. Note that if C = j C j , then the altruism model is a special case of the friendship model because in this case,
Next we adapt the smoothness definition in [19] for the friendship model to the weighted player case; we will later need this to bound the robust PoA for weighted completion time scheduling games. 
Definition 5. Let G α be friendship extension of a cost-minimization game with a weight-bounded social cost function, i.e., C ≤
We define the robust PoA of G α as inf{
friendship extension of a cost-minimization game with weightbounded social cost function
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
One can also generalize the smoothness definition of the altruism model to weighted social costs and by allowing arbitrarys instead of the optimal s * in the term that is to be bounded. However, we do not need such generality in this paper and thus leave it out for simplicity.
Social Contribution Games
Definition 6. Let G = (N, {Σ i } i∈N , {C i } i∈N ) be a cost-minimization game with social cost C : Σ → R. We call G a (cost-minimization) social contribution game (SCG) if for all players i there exists a default strategy ∅ i such that for all s ∈ Σ,
The strategy ∅ i is often interpreted as 'refusing to participate in the game'. In that sense, i pays exactly the social cost he causes by choosing to play; in the payoffmaximization case, he gets exactly what he contributes to the social welfare. So social contribution games are 'fair' in some sense.
Basic utility games [26] satisfy the definition of an SCG (see also Section 7). In particular, the competitive facility location game (which is a basic utility game by [26] ) is an SCG.
We now show that social contribution games satisfy a nice invariance property with respect to their α-altruistic extensions.
Lemma 1.
Any social contribution game is altruism-independently smooth, i.e., for all α = (α i ) i∈N and corresponding altruistic extensions G α of G, the robust price of anarchy in G and G α is the same.
Thus for all strategy profiles s, s * , and all α ∈ R N ,
The notions of α-altruistic extensions and α-independent smoothness can be easily extended to α ∈ R N . The above lemma continues to hold in this case. So even if a player wants to hurt society, the robust PoA stays the same.
Social Contribution Bounded Games
In this case, we define the corresponding social contribution gameḠ = (N,
Again, we think of ∅ i as the option that i does not participate. Note that ∅ i need not actually be an element of Σ i . In many games such as scheduling or congestion games, it is not an option not to participate (i.e., not to use any resources). So formally, we should require: There exists a function C :
for all i and s. However, there is a natural way to extend C (and C i ) on i∈N (Σ i ∪ {∅ i }), as we will see later. So for simplicity of notation, we write C instead of C.
The following theorem shows that if we want to get a bound on the PoA of α-altruistic extensions of an SC-bounded game, we might as well consider the corresponding SCG regardless of α.
Theorem 3. Let G be social contribution bounded and suppose that the robust price of anarchy of the corresponding SCGḠ is ξ. Then for all altruistic extensions G α of G, the robust price of anarchy is at most ξ.
where the inequality follows from applying SC-boundedness twice. Summing over all players i, it follows that G α is (λ, µ)-smooth ifḠ is. ⊓ ⊔ Now, in order to be able to make statements about friendship extensions, we need a slightly stronger definition.
Definition 8.
Assume a cost minimization game G with weight-bounded social cost satisfies three assumptions for all s ∈ Σ and players i:
the weighted impact of i's participation on the players' costs is bounded by his impact on the social cost)
Then we call G strongly SC-bounded.
If all weights are 1, then assumption (3) easily follows from 3b. C(s) = j C j (s) (social cost is sum of individual costs).
Using this definition, we are able to derive bounds on friendship extensions: Proof. Consider the friendship extension G α of G, where
We calculate that for all i:
Summing over all i, it follows that ifḠ is (λ, µ)-smooth 4 , then so is G α .
⊓ ⊔
If all weights are 1, then SC-boundedness follows from strong SC-boundedness. To see this, consider the case where α = 0 and carry out the proof of Theorem 4 for s instead of (s i , s −i ).
Minsum Machine Scheduling
A scheduling game G = (m, n, (p ij ) i∈M,j∈N , (w j ) j∈N ) consists of a set of jobs (players) [n] = {1, . . . , n} and a set of machines [m] = {1, . . . , m}. For each machine i and job j, p ij ∈ R + denotes the processing time of j on i. Furthermore, w j is the weight of job j. The strategy space Σ i of a job j is simply the set of machines. By ∅ i = ∅ we mean the strategy where i uses no machine.
Let x be a strategy profile. For a machine i, we denote by X i the set of jobs that are scheduled on i. Furthermore, x j denotes the machine j is assigned to. Following the notation by Cole et al. [9] , we define ρ ij = pij wj . We assume that the jobs on a machine are scheduled in increasing order of ρ ij , which is known as Smith's rule [23] ; if two jobs on a machine have the same time-to-weight ratio, we use a tie-breaking rule. The cost C j of job j which it seeks to minimize is simply its completion time. In the following, we assume for simplicity that the ρ ij are pairwise distinct (but the results continue to hold without this assumption). Then we can write
The social cost C we consider is the weighted sum of the players' completion times, i.e., C = j w j C j .
In the following, we use the three-field notation by Graham et al [13] . In this notation, the problem we described is denoted by R|| j w j C j . If all weights are 1, we write j C j instead of j w j C j . Furthermore, if there are speeds s i for each machine i and fixed processing times p j for each job such that p ij = p j /s i , we write Q instead of R. Finally, if we have in addition identical speeds s i = 1 for all machines i, the problem is denoted by P . 4 in the sense that there exists ∈ Σ and an optimal s * ∈ Σ such that for all s ∈ Σ it holds that i Ci(si, s−i) ≤ λC(s) + µC(s * ), generalizing Roughgarden's definition of smoothness [21] .
R||
j w j C j
Lemma 2 ([9]). For all strategy profiles x and x
where X * i is defined similarly to X i as For jobs j and k, α jk has an influence on j's strategy in an equilibrium only if there is a machine i such that k gets scheduled after j on i because j cannot influence k's costs otherwise. Hence the weight condition tells us that the only jobs that could potentially have an influence on j are in fact the jobs that are at least equally important as j. Hence j cannot 'misplace his affections' and care too much about unimportant jobs.
Proof. First we show that G is strongly SC-bounded. Clearly, (1) and (2) are satisfied. It remains to show that (3) holds. For all jobs j and strategy profiles x,
It follows that if
where the inequality follows from the condition on the weights. So G is indeed strongly SC-bounded.
We calculatē
Summing over all machines i and j ∈ X * i , this is the same expression as in Lemma 2.
andḠ is (2, 1/2)-smooth. It follows by Theorem 4 that the robust PoA in the friendship model is at most 4.
⊓ ⊔ This bound is tight: [10] shows that the pure PoA for RP || j C j is 4. RP || j C j is almost defined as P || j C j with the exception that each player i can only use a subset of the set of machines, i.e. Σ i ⊆ [m] (R stands for restricted). Consider an instance of RP || j C j . We can simulate restrictions in the R|| j C j setting by letting p ij > max x C j (x) for machines i that are not allowed for j, where x runs over the feasible schedules of the original instance. Then j neither chooses i in a Nash equilibrium nor in the optimal schedule. Hence the PoA stays the same in the new game. Thus the lower bounds in [10] also work for our setting.
The weight condition is necessary. In fact, if we drop it, the pure PoA is unbounded even for P || j w j C j instances with unit-size jobs. An illustrating example is given in Appendix B.
P || j C j
Fix an ordering of the jobs such that p j > p j ′ implies j > j ′ . We use the same notation as in [17] : For a schedule x, a job j and a machine i, let h
. This is the number of jobs that are scheduled after j on i. Using this notation, we can writeC j (x) = C j (x) + h x xj (j) · p j for instances with unit speeds. Throughout this section, letx denote the randomized schedule that assigns each job to each machine with probability 1 m . Lemma 3. Let x be an arbitrary schedule. Then
Note that, surprisingly, this is independent of x.
Proof. Clearly,
Reordering the second sum gives us
The following theorem will be helpful to establish an upper bound on the robust PoA for the friendship model and might be of independent interest. We defer its proof to Appendix C.
Theorem 6. For any schedule x and any optimal
In particular, the robust price of anarchy of P || j C j is at most
. This bound is tight.
Theorem 7.
Let G be an instance of P || j C j . Then the robust PoA for any friendship extension G α is at most 2.
Proof. Let x be arbitrary. Then by linearity of expectation,
We know that
Hence the second term evaluates as
We know by Theorem 6
for any schedule x * . Hence the robust PoA for the friendship extension is at most 2. ⊓ ⊔
Linear Congestion Games
An atomic congestion game G = (N, E, {Σ i } i∈N , (d e ) e∈E ) is given by a set E of resources together with delay functions d e : N → R + indicating the delay on e for a given number of players using e. Each player's strategy set consists of subsets of E; Σ i ⊆ P(E) for all i. For s ∈ Σ, let x e (s) = |{i ∈ N | e ∈ s i }|. The cost of each player i under s is given by C i (s) = e∈si d e (x e (s)). If all delay functions are linear, we say that G is linear. The social cost C is simply the sum over all individual cost. By ∅ i = ∅ we mean the strategy where player i uses no machine. It is known that we can without loss of generality assume that all latency functions are of the form l e (x) = x. This was first mentioned in [8] . For a proof, see [7] . The following lemma is shown in the proof of [8, Theorem 1] .
Lemma 4 ([8]). Let G be a linear congestion game and s, s
x e (s * )(x e (s) + 1).
Lemma 5 ([1]).
For any pair α, β ∈ N, it holds that Bilò et al. show in their paper [1] that the pure PoA lies between 5 and 17/3 for a restricted friendship setting, where α ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j. We generalize their result to the robust PoA for arbitrary α ij ∈ [0, 1] and show tightness. Proof. We havē
so G is SC-bounded. Also G is strongly SC-bounded: If i does not use any machine, he experiences no waiting time; the other's completion times can only increase if another player enters; and finally, C = j C j . Let s, s * ∈ Σ. We abbreviate x e (s) and x e (s * ) by x e and x * e , respectively. The calculation of the robust PoA forḠ yields
The first term is at most e x * e (x e + 1) by Lemma 4. The second term is bounded from above by i e∈s * i x e (s) = e∈E x e x * e . Hence we get in total by Lemma 5 It follows that the robust PoA ofḠ is at most . We show now that the bound of 17 3 is asymptotically tight. Let n ≥ 0. Consider an instance with n + 3 blocks of players B 0 , . . . , B n+2 consisting of three players each:
We construct a Nash equilibrium s and an optimal strategy profile s * as follows. For all resources e, we set l e (x) = x. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n, the pattern of strategies repeats (see Figure 1) . Here player i = a k has two strategies s i = {3k, 3k + 1, 3k + 2} and s * i = {3k + 6}. Player i = b k has two strategies s i = {3k + 2, 3k + 3} and s * i = {3k+7}. Player i = c k has two strategies s i = {3k+3, 3k+4} and s * i = {3k+8}. The strategies s i of players in the final blocks B n+1 and B n+2 are defined as above. However, we need to change the definition of s * i because otherwise, s is not a Nash equilibrium. So for each i ∈ B n+1 ∪ B n+2 , we insert sets of new, previously unused resources
For the following tuples of players (i, j) it holds that α ij = 1: a k+2 ), (c k , b k+2 ) , where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. All other α ij are zero. Hence α ij = 1 iff s * i intersects s j . Note that if s i ∩ s j = ∅, then α ij = 0. Now, we claim that s is a Nash equilibrium. In fact, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n and i = a k , C α (s) = C(s) + j =i α ij C j (s) = 7 + 5 + 5 + 7 = 24, which equals C α i (s * , s −i ) = 4 + 6 + 6 + 8. A similar calculation shows construction of s * i . Hence s is indeed a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that s * is optimal.
For k = 1, . . . , n, block B k has the same cost:
) and observe that these are constants independent of n. It follows that
Auctions
An auction G consists of an allocation rule a : Σ → N which determines which bidder gets the item and a pricing rule p : Σ → R N indicating how much each player should pay. Each bidder i is assumed to have a certain valuation v i ∈ R + for the item. For a given bidding profile b ∈ R N + , the social welfare is Π(b) = v a(b) . Player i's utility is given by Π i (b) = v i − p i (b) if he gets the object and −p i (b) otherwise. In a secondprice auction, the highest bidder gets the item and pays the second highest bid, while everybody else pays nothing.
We do not allow overbidding, i.e., for all bidders i, b i ≤ v i . This is a standard assumption because overbidding is a dominated strategy. We denote by β(b, i) the name of the player who places the i-th highest bid in b. We write β(i) instead of β(b, i) if the bidding profile is clear from the context. ∅ i = 0 denotes the strategy where bidder i bids nothing. Proof. Let G be an auction of the described type. We show that G is SC-bounded. Let b be a bidding profile. We calculatē
because we do not allow overbidding.
So G is SC-bounded. Now, let b * be the optimal bidding profile where the bidder with the highest valuation, say bidder 1, bids his valuation and everybody else bids nothing. Let b be arbitrary. Note that here the friendship model is not a generalization of the altruism model because Π = i Π i . We defer the proof to Appendix D.
Valid Utility Games
A valid utility game [26] is defined as a payoff-maximization game G = (N, E, {Σ i } i∈N , {Π} i∈N , V ), where E is a ground set of resources, Σ i ⊆ P(E) and V is a submodular and non-negative function on E. The social welfare Π is given by Π(s) = V ( i∈N s i ) and is assumed to be sum-bounded. Furthermore, we require G to satisfy Π i (s) ≥ Π(s) − Π(∅, s −i ) for all s ∈ Σ. If G additionally satisfies the last inequation with equality, it is called basic utility game [26] . For all players i, set ∅ i = ∅.
Theorem 11 ([21]). The robust PoA of valid utility games with non-decreasing
5 set function V is bounded by 2.
An example for valid utility games with non-decreasing set functions are competitive facility location games without fixed costs [26] .
The following theorem has already been proven in [7] and tightness of this bound has been shown in [2] for the base game. We now use our framework to provide a shorter proof that illustrates nicely why the robust PoA does not increase for altruistic extensions: The corresponding SCG falls into the same category of games. Proof. It follows directly from the definition that G is SC-bounded. It is easy to verify that the corresponding SCGḠ = (N, E, {Σ i } i∈N , {Π} i∈N , V ) is again a valid utility game: Let σ be a coarse equilibrium for G α and let s be a random variable with distribution σ. In addition, let s * be an arbitrary strategy profile and lets be as in the definition of smoothness. We assume without loss of generality thats is a pure strategy profile; the arguments also work in the mixed case. Because σ is a coarse equilibrium, for all players i we have
Using linearity of expectation, it follows that
B Necessity of Weight Condition
Let us assume we have m machines and m jobs of weight 1 as well as m(m − 1) jobs of weight 0. Let A i (i = 1, 2) denote the set of jobs of weight i. Set α jk = 1 if j ∈ A 1 , k ∈ A 0 , 0 otherwise. First, consider the schedule x where every job in A 1 gets scheduled on machine 1 and all the jobs from A 0 are distributed among the remaining m − 1 machines such that every machine i ∈ {2, . . . , m} gets exactly m jobs. We can assume that the tiebreaking rule among jobs in A 0 is such that they cannot improve their completion time by deviating. Then x is a Nash equilibrium: Indeed, let j ∈ A 1 . Then C j (x) ≤ m and for all i ∈ {2, . . . , m}, C j (i, x −j ) = 1 + k∈A0: x k =i 1 = 1 + m. Hence j has no incentive to deviate. Note that C(x) = m j=1 j = 1 2 m(m + 1). Now, in an optimal schedule x * , the jobs are distributed among the machines in such a way that every machine completes exactly one job of weight 1. Hence an optimal schedule satisfies C(x * ) = m. It follows that the pure PoA is at least C Robust PoA of P || j C j In order to characterize the optimal solution, we use the Minimum Mean Flow Time (MFT) algorithm [18] that produces an optimal schedule for Q|| j C j . A formal description of the algorithm is given below [17] .
Algorithm 1 The MFT Algorithm
For each machine i set hi = 0
while not all jobs are placed do Take the longest job j of the set of unscheduled jobs Assign j to the machine i with the smallest value of (hi + 1)/si For the chosen machine update hi := hi + 1 end while Sort the jobs on each machine in SPT order Lemma 6. Let x * be an optimal schedule for P || j C j . Then C(x * ) = j p j (1 + ⌊(n − j)/m⌋).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x * is generated by the MFT algorithm. Consider some job j and let i = x * j . For each job j ′ that is considered after j (i.e., each job with smaller index), the algorithm chooses a machine i ′ that minimizes h x * i ′ (j ′ ). So it chooses exactly m − 1 other machines before it places another job on i (provided that the algorithm always uses the same tie-breaking rule on the set of machines). Hence j causes a delay of p j for himself and for ⌊(n − j)/m⌋ other machines. Summing over all jobs j, the formula follows. 
The second sum equals Proof. Unfortunately, G is not strongly SC-bounded because assumption (3) is not satisfied. However, we can still bound the coarse PoA for G α by usingḠ in the following way.
Consider a Nash equilibrium b and a valuation profile v such that, say, bidder 1 has the highest value for the item. Let b * be as in the last proof, i.e., bidder 1 bids his value and everybody else bids nothing. . A canonical calculation shows that the same holds for coarse equilibria. Now, in the previous proof we saw that G is (1, −1)-smooth with respect to b * . So the coarse PoA of G is at most 2. It remains to show that this bound is tight. Consider the following situation: We have two bidders with v 1 = 1, v 2 = 2, α 12 = α 21 = 1. Clearly, it is optimal to allocate the item to bidder 2 with a social welfare of 2. However, the bidding profile b = (1, 0) is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, bidder 2 has a utility of Π α (b) = 1 which remains the same if he outbids player 1.
⊓ ⊔
